Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of representatives

Synthese 190 (7):1209-1231 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues in favor of the epistemic properties of inclusiveness in the context of democratic deliberative assemblies and derives the implications of this argument in terms of the epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives. The paper makes the general case that, all other things being equal and under some reasonable assumptions, more is smarter. When applied to deliberative assemblies of representatives, where there is an upper limit to the number of people that can be included in the group, the argument translates into a defense of a specific selection mode of participants: random selection.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-04

Downloads
193 (#104,009)

6 months
44 (#94,504)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):591-611.
Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The trouble with Hooligans.Robert B. Talisse - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):1-12.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations