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  1. Type-a Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus.Istvan A. Aranyosi - 2005 - Dissertation, Central European University
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  2. Physicalism, Dualism, and Metaphysical Gridlock.Katalin Balog - manuscript
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
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  3. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  4. Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
    This paper was chosen by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best articles appearing in print in 2000. Reprinted in Volume XXIII of The Philosopher’s Annual. In his very influential book David Chalmers argues that if physicalism is true then every positive truth is a priori entailed by the full physical description – this is called “the a priori entailment thesis – but ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness are not so entailed and he concludes that Physicalism is false. As (...)
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  5. Structure of Twins in Gaas Nanowires Grown by the Vapour-Liquid-Solid Process.R. Banerjee, A. Bhattacharya, A. Genc & B. M. Arora - 2006 - Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.
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  6. A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):97-115.
    I argue that a strong mind–body dualism is required of any formulation of quantum mechanics that satisfies a relatively weak set of explanatory constraints. Dropping one or more of these constraints may allow one to avoid the commitment to a mind–body dualism but may also require a commitment to a physical–physical dualism that is at least as objectionable. Ultimately, it is the preferred basis problem that pushes both collapse and no-collapse theories in the direction of a strong dualism in resolving (...)
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  7. Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2006 - Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  8. Why I Am Not a Dualist.Karen Bennett - manuscript
    Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the (...)
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  9. Benedikt Paul Goecke, Ed., After Physicalism. Reviewed By.Matteo Benocci - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (4):198-200.
    This is a review of After Phyiscalism (ed. B. P. Göcke, University of Notre Dame Press 2012), a collection of eleven essays addressing the mind-body problem from a non-physicalist point of view.
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  10. Fondazione del problema del pensare.Daniele Bertini - 2007 - Segni E Comprensione 21 (62):124-140.
    My main claim is that, in order to account for the nature of human mind, philosophy of mind should embody topics usually treated by disciplines as ethics or applied philosophy so as to enrich the pure notion of cognitive experience to the extent of treating the whole of human experience. I begin with considering the Cartesian approach to the "cogito". I argue for the claim that cartesian-like dualists (Descartes and Locke, Kant and Husserl) fail in treating the opposition of internalism (...)
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  11. Conscious Objections: God and the Consciousness Debates.Kirsten Birkett - 2006 - Zygon 41 (2):249-266.
  12. Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness.Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield - 1987 - Blackwell.
  13. Undefeated Dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  14. The Attribute Theory of Mind.John Bricke - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.
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  15. Dualism and Mind.Scott Calef - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Metaphysics of Consciousness, and David Chalmers's Property Dualism.Chhanda Chakraborti - 2002 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.
  17. Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Iconicity Instead of Indexicality.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):135-182.
    This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some (...)
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  18. Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties.Jason Costanzo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (4):1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  19. Written in the Flesh: Isaac Newton on the Mind–Body Relation.Liam P. Dempsey - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):420-441.
    Isaac Newton’s views on the mind–body relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mind–body monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the power by which we move our (...)
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  20. RoboMary, Blue Banana Tricks, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness: A Critique of Daniel Dennett's Apology for Physicalism.John M. DePoe - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (1):119-132.
    Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense of (...)
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  21. Fodor's Gloom, or What Does It Mean That Dualism Seems True?Eric Dietrich - 1999 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.
    Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem (...)
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  22. Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW]Eric Dietrich - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  23. Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism.Frank B. Dilley - 2004 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.
  24. Brain and Mind: Two or One?John C. Eccles - 1987 - In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.
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  25. The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture.Christina E. Erneling (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Clearly the Cartesian ontological commitments that have dominated the scientific study of the mind up to the present have not been helpful. ...
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  26. What Does It Mean to Be a Bodily Soul?C. Stephen Evans & Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2015 - Philosophia Christi 17 (2):315-330.
    Evangelical scholars have recently offered criticisms of mind-body dualism from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and neuroscience. We offer several arguments as to why these reasons for abandoning mind-body dualism fail. Additionally, we offer a positive thesis, a dualism that brings together the best aspects of the Cartesian view and the Thomistic view of human persons. The result is a substance dualism that treats the nature of embodiment quite seriously. This view explains why we, as souls, require a resurrected body (...)
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  27. A Defense of Dualism.John Foster - 1989 - In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. Univ Pr of Virginia.
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  28. A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
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  29. Gehirne Und Personen.Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.) - 2009 - ontos.
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  30. On a Loophole in Causal Closure.Johan Gamper - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):631-636.
    Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view (...)
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  31. Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.Igor Gasparov - 2013 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to be more appropriate than the Zimmerman's (...)
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  32. Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism.Brie Gertler - forthcoming - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument Then and Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...)
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  33. After Physicalism.Benedikt Paul Göcke (ed.) - 2012 - The University of Notre Dame Press.
    Although physicalism has been the dominant position in recent work in the philosophy of mind, this dominance has not prevented a small but growing number of philosophers from arguing that physicalism is untenable for several reasons: both ontologically and epistemologically it cannot reduce mentality to the realm of the physical, and its attempts to reduce subjectivity to objectivity have thoroughly failed. The contributors to After Physicalism provide powerful alternatives to the physicalist account of the human mind from a dualistic point (...)
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  34. From Physicalism to Theological Idealism.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2009 - In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne und Personen. ontos.
    In the first part elements and entailments of an adequate thesis of physicalism are presented. In the second part an argument against these is elaborated. Based on this argument a thesis of theological idealism is sketched.
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  35. Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition.Irwin Goldstein - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
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  36. La Pieza China: Un Experimento Mental Con Sesgo Cartesiano.R. González - 2012 - Revista Chilena de Neuropsicología 7:1-6.
    Este ensayo examina un experimento mental clásico de John Searle en filosofía de la mente, cuyo argumento ha sido descalificado por Dennett y Hofstadter como una bomba de intuiciones no confiable. Lo que se defiende aquí es que este experimento mental tiene un sesgo cartesiano, pero ello no obsta a que no sea confiable. En efecto, la característica principal de la Pieza China es depender de un agente cognitivo consciente que realiza el experimento, y en particular, de quien no se (...)
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  37. Longing for Integration.Rowan Grigg - manuscript
    A lighthearted look at some big themes in metaphysics and epistemology. This paper was written before the author fully appreciated the infinite capacity of the singularity for generating the substrate required to backup and restore the reality it has engendered.
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  38. A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  39. Nomological Dualism: Reply to Four Critics.Ted Honderich - 1981 - Inquiry 24 (December):419-438.
    Three theses about the mind, when conjoined with a certain understanding of lawlike connection, escape the objection that they constitute an epiphenomenalism and so conflict with our conviction of the efficacy of the mental. Certain alternatives to the given picture of the mind, one of them an Identity Theory, are in various respects less defensible. The given picture can be defended against considerations deriving from a contextual conception of the mental, and from an elaborated objection having to do with the (...)
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  40. Psychophysical Law-Like Connections and Their Problems.Ted Honderich - 1981 - Inquiry 24 (October):277-303.
  41. A Model Of Consciousness.Robert H. Kettell - manuscript
    It has been difficult to define human consciousness because of its many differing qualities and because of various views people have of consciousness. It is proposed that these multiple vantage points be united into a single three-dimensional model utilizing breadth, time and depth. This model could provide a more comprehensive definition of consciousness and encourage an exploration of the interplay of consciousness’ many features. Such a model may also help answer some of the many questions that the concept of consciousness (...)
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  42. The Irreducibility of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-18.
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  43. How to Be a Scientifically Respectable 'Property Dualist'.Ran Lahav & N. Shanks - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32.
    We argue that the so-called "property-dualist" theory of consciousness is consistent both with current neurobiological data and with modern theories of physics. The hypothesis that phenomenal properties are global properties that are irreducible to microphysical properties, whose role is to integrate information across large portions of the brain, is consistent with current neurobiological knowledge. These properties can exercise their integration function through action on microscopic structures in the neuron without violating the laws of quantum mechanics. Although we offer no positive (...)
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  44. From Biological Naturalism to Emergent Subject Dualism.Eric LaRock - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (1):97-118.
    I argue (1) that Searle's reductive stance about mental causation is unwarranted on evolutionary, logical, and neuroscientific grounds; and (2) that his theory of weak emergence, called biological naturalism, fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject unity. Finally I propose a stronger variety of emergence called emergent subject dualism (ESD) to fill the gaps in Searle's account, and support ESD on grounds of recent evidence in neuroscience. Hence I show how it is possible, if not also (...)
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  45. Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World.Noa Latham - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.
  46. Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal?Lim Daniel & Wang Hao - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA is (...)
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  47. Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism.Douglas C. Long - 1969 - Philosophical Forum 1 (3):259-273.
  48. Uwe Meixner, the Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psycho-Physical Dualism, Paderborn, Mentis, 2004, 486 Pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376-. [REVIEW]E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):290-294.
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  49. Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind.David Ludwig - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1):245-257.
    Although Hilary Putnam has played a significant role in shaping contemporary philosophy of mind, he has more recently criticised its metaphysical foundations as fun-damentally flawed. According to Putnam, the standard positions in the philosophy of mind rest on dubious ontological assumptions which are challenged by his “pragmatic pluralism” and the idea that we can always describe reality in different but equally fun-damental ways. Putnam considers this pluralism about conceptual resources as an alterna-tive to both physicalism and dualism. Contrary to physicalism, (...)
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  50. Giving Dualism its Due.William Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
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