Identity and the composite Christ: an incarnational dilemma: ROBIN LE POIDEVIN

Religious Studies 45 (2):167-186 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One way of understanding the reduplicative formula ‘Christ is, qua God, omniscient, but qua man, limited in knowledge’ is to take the occurrences of the ‘ qua ’ locution as picking out different parts of Christ: a divine part and a human part. But this view of Christ as a composite being runs into paradox when combined with the orthodox understanding of the Incarnation, according to which Christ is identical to the second person of the Trinity. In response, we have to choose between modifying the orthodox understanding, adopting a philosophically and theologically contentious perdurantist account of persistence through time, or rejecting altogether the idea of the composite Christ

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-30

Downloads
66 (#252,579)

6 months
14 (#200,872)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robin Le Poidevin
University of Leeds

References found in this work

Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
Parthood and identity across time.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):201-220.

View all 15 references / Add more references