Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective

Episteme 2 (1):25-38 (2005)

Authors
Christian List
London School of Economics
Abstract
In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group can meet two challenges: the ‘rationality challenge’ and the ‘knowledge challenge’. The rationality challenge arises when a group is required to endorse consistent beliefs or judgments; the knowledge challenge arises when the group’s beliefs or judgments are required to track certain truths. My discussion seeks to identify those properties of an aggregation procedure that affect a group’s success at meeting each of the two challenges.
Keywords Group knowledge  Group rationality  Collective belief  Social epistemology  Judgment aggregation
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.25
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.R. Nozick - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (1):83-85.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Goldman - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185-190.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Group Agency and Supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):85-105.
Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.

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