Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective
Episteme 2 (1):25-38 (2005)
Abstract
In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group can meet two challenges: the ‘rationality challenge’ and the ‘knowledge challenge’. The rationality challenge arises when a group is required to endorse consistent beliefs or judgments; the knowledge challenge arises when the group’s beliefs or judgments are required to track certain truths. My discussion seeks to identify those properties of an aggregation procedure that affect a group’s success at meeting each of the two challenges.Author's Profile
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2006
DOI
10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.25
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Citations of this work
What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups.Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht - 2013 - Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
Collective Moral Agency and Self-Induced Moral Incapacity.Niels de Haan - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-22.
Group Agency and Supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-20.
References found in this work
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185-190.