The Insignificance of Choice and Wallace’s Normative Approach to Responsibility

Law and Philosophy 26 (1):67-93 (2007)
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Paul Litton
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Psychopathy and responsibility theory.Paul Litton - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):676-688.
Volitional excuses, self-narration, and blame.Marion Smiley - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):85-101.
Volitional excuses, self-narration, and blame.Marion Smiley - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):85-101.

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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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