Three Concepts of Free Action

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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49 (1):95-126 (1975)
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10.1093/aristoteliansupp/49.1.95

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Harry G. Frankfurt
Princeton University

Citations of this work

What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.

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