Abstract

Levinas rarely speaks about non-human animals directly, but his texts and his interviews are saturated with animal rhetoric. Levinas’s most ubiquitous gesture is to cast non-human animals as beings whose striving to live is a form of violence. These images constitute violence as endemic to nature, and provide the essential contrast to what Levinas regards as the strictly human event of ethics. In order to sufficiently interrogate the fate of non-human animals in Levinas’s philosophy, we must address the manner in which this animal imagery functions in Levinas’s rhetoric. What conceptions of the human are sustained, and what possibilities for an ethical comportment toward non-human animals are foreclosed, as a result of this oppositional imagery? How do essential vulnerabilities appear only as violence, and what forms of violence remain unacknowledged through their veiling by related vulnerabilities? What philosophical consequences result from Levinas’s relegation of violence, including human violence, to the figure of the animal or to animality? How might Levinas’s philosophy be transformed if we were to address ourselves to his imaginative acts of segregation and complementarity vis-à-vis human beings and non-human animals?