Bayesian probability

Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127 (2010)
Abstract
Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
Keywords Bayesian probability  Logical probability  Inductive probability  Subjective probability  Degrees of belief  Decision theory  Expected utility  Explication  Carnap
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9471-6
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References found in this work BETA
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
The Continuum of Inductive Methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - University of Chicago Press.
Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.
The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.

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