Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127 (2009)
Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
|Keywords||Bayesian probability Logical probability Inductive probability Subjective probability Degrees of belief Decision theory Expected utility Explication Carnap|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
My Basic Conceptions of Probability and Induction, PA Schilpp Ed.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill., Open Court.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. [REVIEW]Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.
Should Physicians Be Bayesian Agents?M. Wayne Cooper - 1992 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 13 (4).
Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
Probabilistic Induction and Hume's Problem: Reply to Lange.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.
Added to index2009-02-23
Total downloads167 ( #27,522 of 2,168,635 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #127,283 of 2,168,635 )
How can I increase my downloads?