Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127 (2010)

Abstract
Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
Keywords Bayesian probability  Logical probability  Inductive probability  Subjective probability  Degrees of belief  Decision theory  Expected utility  Explication  Carnap
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2009, 2010
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9471-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,577
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-02-23

Total views
246 ( #46,454 of 2,533,614 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #389,998 of 2,533,614 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes