In Clancy Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press (2009)

Authors
James Mahon
Lehman College (CUNY)
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including those who are bent on harming innocent others.
Keywords Lies  Lying  Kant  Benjamin Constant  Allen Wood  Practical philosophy
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Lying and Misleading in Discourse.Andreas Stokke - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):83-134.
Lying, Deceiving, and Misleading.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):348-359.
Paternalistic Lying and Deception.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Paternalism. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
The Constitutive Approach to Kantian Rigorism.Michael Cholbi - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):439-448.

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