Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth

Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166 (2010)
Abstract
Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence
Keywords Kant  truth  definitions
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DOI 10.1515/kant.2010.011
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Lessons on Truth From Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.
Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.

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