Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth

Kant Studien 101 (2):147-166 (2010)
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Abstract

Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of truth. Kant's claim is not a generic way of setting aside a correspondence definition of truth, or of considering it uninformative. Being the nominal definition of truth, the formula “truth is the agreement of cognition with its object” illustrates the meaning of the predicate “is true” and people's ordinary conception of truth. True judgements correspond to the objects they are about. However, there could be more to the property of truth than correspondence

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Citations of this work

Kant’s Theory of Concept Formation and his Theory of Definitions.Matthew McAndrew - 2023 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 105 (4):591-619.
Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
Truthmaker Noumenalism.Damian Melamedoff-Vosters - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):40-55.

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References found in this work

The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
The folly of trying to define truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
Replies.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):424–439.
Kant, truth and human nature.Robert Hanna - 2000 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):225 – 250.

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