Philosophers' Imprint:1-34 (forthcoming)

Authors
Ben Holguín
Princeton University
Abstract
This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well.
Keywords belief  guessing  contextualism  question-sensitivity  doxastic voluntarism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge by Constraint.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives:1-28.
Changes in Attitude.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Desiring To Believe.Grace Yee - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):446-455.
Some Results About (+) Proved by Iterated Forcing.Tetsuya Ishiu & Paul B. Larson - 2012 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 77 (2):515-531.
On Guessing Generalized Clubs at the Successors of Regulars.Assaf Rinot - 2011 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (7):566-577.
Freedom and Reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.
Club Guessing Sequences and Filters.Tetsuya Ishiu - 2005 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (4):1037-1071.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-09-15

Total views
173 ( #60,925 of 2,448,745 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
173 ( #2,995 of 2,448,745 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes