Thinking, Guessing, and Believing

Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34 (2022)

Abstract

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-09-15

Downloads
374 (#28,293)

6 months
99 (#6,943)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ben Holguín
Johns Hopkins University

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.

View all 70 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Desiring To Believe.Grace Yee - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):446-455.
Some Results About (+) Proved by Iterated Forcing.Tetsuya Ishiu & Paul B. Larson - 2012 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 77 (2):515-531.
On Guessing Generalized Clubs at the Successors of Regulars.Assaf Rinot - 2011 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (7):566-577.
Freedom and (Theoretical) Reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.
Club Guessing Sequences and Filters.Tetsuya Ishiu - 2005 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (4):1037-1071.