- Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
- Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
- Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
- Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscriptdetails
- How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscriptdetails
- Self-Locating Belief and the Goal of Accuracy.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- Aggregating Agents with Opinions About Different Propositions.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- How Should Your Beliefs Change When Your Awareness Grows?Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
- I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Suspicious Conspiracy Theories.M. Dentith - forthcoming - Synthese.details
- Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
- Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.details
- Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint:1-34.details
- On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
- Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-15.details
- Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
- Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
- Kolmogorov Conditionalization, A New Argument For.Michael Nielsen - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-16.details
- Decision Theory and Degree of Belief.Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.details
- Uncertainty Phobia and Epistemic Forbearance in a Pandemic.Nicholas Shackel - forthcoming - In Anneli Jefferson, Orestis S. Palermos, Panos Paris & Jonathan Webber (eds.), Values and Virtues for a Challenging World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
- Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Categorical Versus Graded Beliefs.Franz Dietrich - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 18.details
- What Is ‘Real’ in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):102-116.details
- Faith and Reason.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), The Handbook of Philosophy and Religion. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 167-177.details
- Immoral Lies and Partial Beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.details
- The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):326-345.details
- Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):367-387.details
- The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):617-634.details
- Machine-Believers Learning Faiths & Knowledges: The New Gospel of Artificial Intelligence.Virgil W. Brower - 2021 - Internationales Jahrbuch Für Medienphilosophie 7 (1):97-121.details
- A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
- Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-21.details
- The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021 - In Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-54.details
- Beliefs Don’T Simplify Our Reasoning, Credences Do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
- Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
- Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.details
- Settling the Unsettled: Roles for Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):359-368.details
- Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
- Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.details
- The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):587-602.details
- Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):395-414.details
- Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3217-3236.details
- Weintraub’s Response to Williamson’s Coin Flip Argument.Matthew W. Parker - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.details
- On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
- How Can Representationalism Accommodate Degrees of Belief? A Dispositional Representationalist Proposal.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8943-8964.details
- Coherently Updating Degrees of Belief: Radical Probabilism, the Generalization of Bayes' Theorem and its Consequences on Evidence Evaluation.Franco Taroni, Paolo Garbolino & Silvia Bozza - 2021 - Law, Probability and Risk 19 (3-4).details
- On Perceptual Confidence and “Completely Trusting Your Experience”.Jacob Beck - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):174-188.details
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|