Thought and Knowledge: Essays

Cornell University Press (1977)
Abstract
Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking.--Thoughtless brutes.--Descartes' proof that he is essentially a non-material thing.--Behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology.--The privacy of experience.--Wittgenstein on the nature of mind.--The myth of cognitive processes and structures.--Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know."--The groundlessness of belief.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of
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Call number BD161.M283
ISBN(s) 0801410746  
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Grice's Razor.Allan Hazlett - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):669-690.
Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.
Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs, and Intentionality, to Animals.R. Routley - 1981 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):385-417.
Wittgenstein + Heidegger on the Stream of Life.Theodore R. Schatzki - 1993 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):307 – 328.

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