Scientific Discovery from the Point of View of Acceptance

Abstract

In the four papers available on our web site (of which this is the first), we propose to develop an inductive logic. By “inductive logic” we mean a set of principles that distinguish between successful and unsuccessful strategies for scientific inquiry. Our logic will have a technical character, since it is built from the concepts and terminology of (elementary) model theory. The reader may therefore wish to know something about the kind of results on offer before investing time in definitions and notation. Providing such an informal overview is the purpose of the present essay. We begin with discussion of the central concept under investigation, namely, theory acceptance.

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Inductive Acceptance and Knowledge.Li-wen Xiong - 2006 - Modern Philosophy 2:120-125.
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Salmon's Paper.Henry E. Kyburg - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):147-151.

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