Topoi 13 (2):83-92 (1994)

Authors
Gabriele Usberti
Università degli Studi di Siena
Abstract
In section 1 we argue that the adoption of a tenseless notion of truth entails a realistic view of propositions and provability. This view, in turn, opens the way to the intelligibility of theclassical meaning of the logical constants, and consequently is incompatible with the antirealism of orthodox intuitionism. In section 2 we show how what we call the potential intuitionistic meaning of the logical constants can be defined, on the one hand, by means of the notion of atemporal provability and, on the other, by means of the operator K of epistemic logic. Intuitionistic logic, as reconstructed within this perspective, turns out to be a part of epistemic logic, so that it loses its traditional foundational role, antithetic to that of classical logic. In section 3 we uphold the view that certain consequences of the adoption of atemporal notion of truth, despite their apparent oddity, are quite acceptable from an antirealist point of view.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00763507
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References found in this work BETA

Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - Oxford University Press.
Knowability and Constructivism.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):422-432.
Reply to Dag Prawitz.Michael Dummett - 1987 - In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--316.
“Knowability and Constructivism&Quot.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):422-432.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intuitionistic epistemic logic.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):266-298.

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