Temporal and atemporal truth in intuitionistic mathematics

Topoi 13 (2):83-92 (1994)
In section 1 we argue that the adoption of a tenseless notion of truth entails a realistic view of propositions and provability. This view, in turn, opens the way to the intelligibility of theclassical meaning of the logical constants, and consequently is incompatible with the antirealism of orthodox intuitionism. In section 2 we show how what we call the potential intuitionistic meaning of the logical constants can be defined, on the one hand, by means of the notion of atemporal provability and, on the other, by means of the operator K of epistemic logic. Intuitionistic logic, as reconstructed within this perspective, turns out to be a part of epistemic logic, so that it loses its traditional foundational role, antithetic to that of classical logic. In section 3 we uphold the view that certain consequences of the adoption of atemporal notion of truth, despite their apparent oddity, are quite acceptable from an antirealist point of view.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00763507
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,191
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael A. E. Dummett - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowability and Constructivism.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):422-432.
Reply to Dag Prawitz.Michael Dummett - 1987 - In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 281--316.
Intensional Mathematics.Stewart Shapiro - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):177-178.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

65 ( #81,184 of 2,172,698 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #56,362 of 2,172,698 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums