In defense of Epistemic Modesty

Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331 (2011)

Abstract

An ambitious project in epistemology is to show that we have justification for anti-skeptical beliefs such as the belief that we are not brains in vats. A much less ambitious project is to account for how perceptual experience justifies ordinary perceptual beliefs like the belief that there is a cat in front of me. One problem is that these two projects are entangled in such manner that the failure of the anti-skeptical project seems to entail the failure of the project of accounting for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs. This paper offers a way to disentangle these two projects.

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2011-08-06

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Farid Masrour
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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