Non-cognitivism and rule-following

In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Boston: Routledge (1981)
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Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Objectionable thick concepts in denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
Principlism, Uncodifiability, and the Problem of Specification.Timothy J. Furlan - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-22.

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