Rule-following and externalism

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140 (2004)
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Abstract

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow

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Rule‐Following and Externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
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Alexander Miller
New York University

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