This article explores the concept of Habit proposed by Deleuze in his early work. When reading is projected from the empiricist tradition and that is why Hume is mainly the author from which Deleuze develops this concept, although he also traverses the thought of Bergson, Ravaisson or Samuel Butler. Our objective is to point out to what extent habit constitutes an essential principle of its metaphysics, by posing it as a peculiar synthesis of time and subjectivity. Therefore, we have tried to link the analyzes described in both Empirisme et subjectivité and Différence et répétition to realize that the problem of temporal syntheses is fundamental to what Deleuze postulates as “transcendental empiricism” in that last book.
Keywords Habitus  Habitus  Hume  Hume  empiricism  empirismo  first synthesis.  genesis  génesis  primera síntesis
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DOI 10.5281/zenodo.5838542
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