Authors
Peter Millican
Oxford University
Abstract
Hume has traditionally been understood as an inductive sceptic with positivist tendencies, reducing causation to regular succession and anticipating the modern distinctions between analytic and synthetic, deduction and induction. The dominant fashion in recent Hume scholarship is to reject all this, replacing the ‘Old Hume’ with various New alternatives. Here I aim to counter four of these revisionist readings, presenting instead a broadly traditional interpretation but with important nuances, based especially on Hume’s later works. He asked that we should treat these— notably the first Enquiry—as his authoritative philosophical statements, and with good reason
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00155.x
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References found in this work BETA

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.David Hume - 1955 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press. pp. 112.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hume's Fork, and His Theory of Relations.Peter Millican - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):3-65.
Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
Hume’s Determinism.Peter Millican - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):611-642.
Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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