Thing and object

Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89 (2008)
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Abstract

There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.

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Author's Profile

Kristie Miller
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

A Consideration of Project Ontology.Brian Tebbitt - forthcoming - Philosophy of Management.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Naming and Necessity.S. A. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

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