Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):455-472 (2004)
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Abstract

I’m very grateful for the attention given to my book by all the commentators, and their various and thoughtful responses have helped me in many ways. Several related issues are raised by the comments of Heal and Reginster, and to avoid repetition I will discuss them together here. Both of them raise questions about the scope and authority of rationality over a person’s beliefs and other attitudes, and ask what is supposed to be wrong with adopting what I describe as a spectator’s point of view on oneself, and whether this stance by itself involves the evasion of rational responsibility for one’s attitudes. They also, in their different ways, provide searching discussions of the ‘rakehell’ case from Chapter 5, where several of these issues come together, so I’d like to respond to those parts of their comments together as well.

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Richard Moran
Harvard University

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