Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency

Analysis 67 (295):223–230 (2007)
Abstract
A number of recent accounts of our first-person knowledge of our attitudes give a central role to transparency - our capacity to answer the question of whether we have an attitude by answering the question of whether to have it. In this paper I raise a problem for such accounts, by showing that there are clear cases of first-person knowledge of attitudes which are not transparent.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/67.3.223
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,674
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Roger White (2005). Epistemic Permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Sarah K. Paul (2012). How We Know What We Intend. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
Sarah K. Paul (2014). The Transparency of Mind. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):295-303.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
Mark McCullagh (2002). Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
Amy Kind (2003). What's so Transparent About Transparency? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
Judith Simon (2010). The Entanglement of Trust and Knowledge on the Web. Ethics and Information Technology 2010 (12):343-355.
Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Quassim Cassam (2011). Knowing What You Believe. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):1-23.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

160 ( #25,986 of 1,903,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #24,414 of 1,903,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.