Self-knowledge: Discovery, resolution, and undoing

European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):141-61 (1997)

Authors
Richard Moran
Harvard University
Abstract
remarks some lessons about self-knowledge (and some other self-relations) as well as use them to throw some light on what might seem to be a fairly distant area of philosophy, namely, Sartre's view of the person as of a divided nature, divided between what he calls the self-as-facticity and the self-as-transcendence. I hope it will become clear that there is not just perversity on my part in bringing together Wittgenstein and the last great Cartesian. One specific connection that will occupy me here is their shared hostility to the idea of theoretical certainty as our model for the authority of ordinary self-knowledge, and their relating of such a theoretical model to specific forms of self-alienation. This, in turn, is related to another concern they share, a concern with the difficulties, philosophical and otherwise, in conceiving of oneself as but one person in the world among others
Keywords Discovery  Epistemology  Resolution  Self-knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0378.00033
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The Moral Development of First‐Person Authority.Victoria McGeer - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):81-108.
Desire and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.

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