On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary


Authors
Sarah Moss
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
This paper motivates and develops a novel semantics for several epistemic expressions, including possibility modals and indicative conditionals. The semantics I defend constitutes an alternative to standard truth conditional theories, as it assigns sets of probability spaces as sentential semantic values. I argue that what my theory lacks in conservatism is made up for by its strength. In particular, my semantics accounts for the distinctive behavior of nested epistemic modals, indicative conditionals embedded under probability operators, and instances of constructive dilemma containing epistemic vocabulary.
Keywords epistemic modals  indicative conditionals  probabilistic semantics
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The Spectre of Triviality.Nate Charlow - forthcoming - Analysis:anz011.
Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.

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