The enumerative character of Tarski's definition of truth and its general character in a Tarskian system
Synthese 126 (1-2):91 - 121 (2001)
In this paper, I suggest an approach to the alleged problem with the Tarskian formal definition of truth: its enumerative character seems to make it unable to capture our pretheoretic general understanding of truth. For this purpose, after spelling out two requirements for extending an enumerative definition to new cases, I examine to what extent Tarski's Convention T provides what are needed for extending the Tarski's enumerative definition. I conclude that, though not explicitly providing what are needed, Convention T does implicitly suggest something quite promising and provide necessary conceptual resources for its further modifications. Then I suggest a Tarskian explicitly general definition of what it is to be a truth-definition on the basis of some theoretical and conceptual resources within Tarski's semantic theory, and I explain how it would make the Tarskian seemingly enumerative formal definition have a general character in accord with our pretheoretic understanding of truth. Finally, I examine the current proposal in comparison with Davidson's approach and in the light of Hintikka's new perspective
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Tarski, Quine, and “Disquotation” Schema (T).Bo Mou - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):119-144.
Similar books and articles
Truth, Meaning, and Translation.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. O.University Press. pp. 247.
Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages.David DeVidi & Graham Solomon - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence.William H. Hanson - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):265-280.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #132,318 of 2,168,638 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,816 of 2,168,638 )
How can I increase my downloads?