Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):341 – 352 (2005)

Authors
Thomas Nadelhoffer
College of Charleston
Abstract
On the surface, it seems intuitively plausible that if an agent luckily manages to perform a desired action (e.g., rolling a six with a fair die or winning the lottery), the performance of which is not the result of any relevant skill on her part, we should not say that she performed the action intentionally. This intuition suggests that our concept of intentional action is sensitive to considerations of skill, luck, and causal control. Indeed, some philosophers have claimed that in order for an action to be performed intentionally it must be performed with a relevant amount of skill or control - i.e., an intentional action cannot simply be the result of luck. On this view, skill and control are necessary conditions of our everyday concept of intentional action. In this essay, I discuss empirical evidence that challenges this claim. After briefly setting the stage, I examine Al Mele and Paul Moser's thorough analysis of intentional action - paying particular attention to some of the interesting scenarios they offer in support of their position. Next, I discuss the results of some simple psychological experiments that show that people's judgments concerning whether actions are intentional can often be affected by the moral features of these actions - features that may trump considerations of skill, luck, and control. Finally, I conclude that if this is correct, philosophers who claim that skill and control are necessary conditions of the folk concept of intentional action appear to be mistaken. One can test attempted philosophical analyses of intentional action partly by ascertaining whether what these analyses entail about particular actions is in line with what the majority of non-specialists would say about these actions if there is a widely shared concept of intentional action, such judgments provide evidence about what the concept is, and a philosophical analysis of intentional action that is wholly unconstrained by that concept runs the risk of having nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter. (Mele, 2001, p. 27).
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080500177309
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,992
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
Two Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.

View all 39 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Intentional Action and "in Order To".Eric Wiland - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action.Steven Sverdlik - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.
Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
120 ( #86,459 of 2,439,425 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #136,786 of 2,439,425 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes