Bias and Conditioning in Sequential medical trials

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1053-1064 (2013)
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Abstract

Randomized Controlled Trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based medicine. Usually, they are conducted as sequential trials allowing for monitoring for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from early stopped trials is often charged with being biased towards implausibly large effects. To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that a shift from unconditional hypothesis tests in the style of Neyman and Pearson to conditional hypothesis tests gives a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and significantly improves the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology.

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Author's Profile

Jan Sprenger
University of Turin

References found in this work

Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.
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Principles of inference and their consequences.Deborah G. Mayo & Michael Kruse - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 381--403.

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