Scientific Problems: Three Empiricist Models

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:3 - 19 (1980)
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Abstract

One component of a viable account of scientific inquiry is a defensible conception of scientific problems. This paper specifies some logical and conceptual requirements that an acceptable account of scientific problems must meet as well as indicating some features that a study of scientific inquiry indicates scientific problems have. On the basis of these requirements and features, three standard empiricist models of problems are examined and found wanting. Finally a constraint inclusion-model of scientific problems is proposed.

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2011-05-29

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Thomas Nickles
University of Nevada, Reno

Citations of this work

Remarks on Truth, Problem-Solving, and Methodology.Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1981 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (3):261.
La falsación empírica y los problemas lacunae.Damian Islas - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Costa Rica) (137):33-41.
Research Problems.Steve Elliott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1013-1037.

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