Thomas Nickles
University of Nevada, Reno
One component of a viable account of scientific inquiry is a defensible conception of scientific problems. This paper specifies some logical and conceptual requirements that an acceptable account of scientific problems must meet as well as indicating some features that a study of scientific inquiry indicates scientific problems have. On the basis of these requirements and features, three standard empiricist models of problems are examined and found wanting. Finally a constraint inclusion-model of scientific problems is proposed.
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La falsación empírica y los problemas lacunae.Damian Islas - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Costa Rica) (137):33-41.
Remarks on Truth, Problem-Solving, and Methodology.Maurice A. Finocchiaro - 1981 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (3):261.
Research Problems.Steve Elliott - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:000-000.
Reevaluating Scientific Progress as a Problem Resolution.Damián Islas - 2014 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 16:133-147.

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