Las críticas de Quine a la individualización atomista del significado

Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 26 (1):121-137 (2001)

This work addresses the objections to analyticity and meaning atribution to single sentences included in Quines Two Dogmas of Empiricism. First, an interpretation of Two Dogmas is provided which implies that the strongest argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on epistemic holism. Then, two possible rejoinders to Quine are presented. They rely on the following thesis: (i) semantic holism that follows from the conjunction of Quines epistemic holism and verificationism is compatible with assignation of meaning to single sentences, which in turn paves the way for a characterization of analyticity; (ii) epistemic holism and the related thesis that every true sentence is empirically revisable are objectionable if we accept criteria of individuation for truth bearers different from those assumed by Quine
Keywords analyticity  Quine   analiticidad   atomismo semántico   revisability   semantic atomism   holismo epistémico   epistemic holism   significado   revisabilidad   meaning
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