Abstract

Pragmatism has been understood by bioethicists as yet another rival in the “methods wars,” as yet another theory of moral deliberation. This has led to criticism of pragmatic bioethics as both theoretically and practically inadequate. Pragmatists’ responses to these objections have focused mainly on misunderstandings of pragmatism’s epistemology. These responses are insufficient. Pragmatism’s commitment to radical empiricism gives it theoretical resources unappreciated by critics and defenders alike. Radical empiricism, unlike its more traditional ancestors, undercuts the gaps between theory and practice, and subjective and objective accounts of experience, and in so doing provides the metaphysical and epistemological basis for a thoroughgoing empirical naturalism in ethics. Pragmatism’s strength as an approach to moral problems thus emerges as a result of a much wider array of resources than contemporary interpreters have acknowledged, which makes it a richer, deeper framework for understanding moral deliberation in general and bioethical decision making in particular