David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Neuroethics 6 (2):237-247 (2013)
Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning, and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers, who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson’s experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally, I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular moral concepts conclusion
|Keywords||Concepts Cognitive science Moral psychology Mental representations Ethics Thin/thick concepts|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
George Lakoff (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Thing: What Catergories Reveal About the Mind. University of Chicago Press.
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Paul M. Churchland (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Joshua May (2014). On the Very Concept of Free Will. Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866.
Similar books and articles
Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1996). The Red Herring and the Pet Fish: Why Concepts Still Can't Be Prototypes. Cognition 58 (2):253-70.
Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Beaulac (2011). Le véritable retour des définitions. Dialogue 50 (1):153-164.
Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1999). Concepts and Cognitive Science. In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Jussi Jylkkä (2011). Hybrid Extensional Prototype Compositionality. Minds and Machines 21 (1):41-56.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2011). Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tommi Vehkavaara (2002). Why and How to Naturalize Semiotic Concepts for Biosemiotics. Sign Systems Studies 30 (1):293-312.
Linda Zagzebski (2010). Exemplarist Virtue Theory. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):41-57.
Hugo Mercier (2010). How to Cut a Concept? Review of Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery. Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):269-277.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2010). Concepts and Theoretical Unification. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):219-220.
Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Edouard Machery (2010). Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz. Mind and Language 25 (5):634-646.
Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka (2009). From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (1995). Two Concepts of Concept. Mind and Language 10 (4):402-22.
Added to index2011-04-18
Total downloads46 ( #105,527 of 1,924,750 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #187,091 of 1,924,750 )
How can I increase my downloads?