Erkenntnis:1-16 (forthcoming)

Richard Pettigrew
Bristol University
Michael Rescorla (2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever you take yourself to learn something with certainty, it's true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla's new argument by giving a very general Dutch Book argument that applies to many cases of updating beyond those covered by Conditionalization, and then showing how Rescorla's version follows as a special case of that. Second, I want to show how to generalise Briggs and Pettigrew's Accuracy Dominance argument to avoid the assumption that Rescorla has identified (Briggs & Pettigrew 2018).
Keywords Bayesian epistemology  Bayesianism  Conditionalization  Dutch Book  Accuracy  Scoring rules  Reflection Principle  formal epistemology  epistemology  credences
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-020-00356-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Distorted Reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.

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