Rules, Reasons and Norms

Philosophical Studies 124 (2):185-197 (2005)
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Abstract

Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought and the reasons that thought marshals. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behaviour. Rules, Reasons, and Norms makes original and illuminating connections across a large swathe of territory, from metaphysics to philosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation

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Philip Pettit
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Looks as powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
The Empowering Theory of Trust.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 14-34.
The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.
Rationality, Reasoning and Group Agency.Philip Pettit - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):495-519.
Existence questions.Amie L. Thomasson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):63 - 78.

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