Justification and Theism

Faith and Philosophy 4 (4):403-426 (1987)
Abstract
The question is: how should a theist think of justification or positive epistemic status? The answer I suggest is: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S only if S’s faculties are functioning properly (i.e., functioning in the way God intended them to) in producing B, and only if S’s cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which her faculties are designed; and under those conditions the more firmly S is inclined to accept B, the more positive epistemic status it has for her. I conclude by making some qualifications and applications and exmaining some objections
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil19874438
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