Consequentializing moral theories

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73 (2007)

Authors
Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University
Abstract
To consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic statuses of actions and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. I explain the motivation for the consequentializing project and defend it against recent criticisms by Mark Schroeder and others.
Keywords consequentialism  Schroeder  morality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00280.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What Kind of Perspectivism?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (4):415-443.
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Save (Some of) the Children.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):465-472.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
168 ( #38,563 of 2,319,065 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #118,774 of 2,319,065 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature