Ramsey, Reference and Reductionism


This is an unpublished piece from July 1998. It discusses the use of semantic notions such as reference in the Canberra Plan, the question whether this use creates a problematic circularity if the Canberra Plan is applied to the semantic notions themselves, and the relation of this question to Putnam’s model-theoretic argument. I used some of the ideas in later papers such as (Price 2004, 2009) and (Menzies & Price, 2009), but the bulk of discussion of the relation of my concern to Putnam’s argument (and to responses to Putnam by others) never made it into print.



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Author's Profile

Huw Price
Cambridge University (PhD)

References found in this work

An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.
Naturalism without representationalism.Huw Price - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in question. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 71--88.

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