Truth and provability: A comment on Redhead

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):611-613 (2005)
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Abstract

Michael Redhead's recent argument aiming to show that humanly certifiable truth outruns provability is critically evaluated. It is argued that the argument is at odds with logical facts and fails

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10.1093/bjps/axi134

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Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

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Mathematics and the mind.Michael Redhead - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):731-737.

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