Strength of Mind and the Calm and Violent Passions

Res Philosophica 92 (3):1-21 (2015)
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Abstract

Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative issues for two reasons. First, it seems as though one might exhibit the prevalence of calm over violent passions, even if the prevailing calm passions are vicious traits of character. Second, the natural virtues for Hume are non-moral motives that garner approval for the effects they tend to produce. But strength of mind is unique in that it is not defined in terms of a particular motive, but in terms of the causal force (strength) of any number of motives in competition with others.

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References found in this work

A progress of sentiments: reflections on Hume's Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Stability and justification in Hume's Treatise.Louis E. Loeb - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Stability and justification in hume’s treatise.Louis Loeb - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):233-235.
The philosophy of David Hume.Norman Kemp Smith - 1948 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 138:235-241.

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