Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426 - 443 (2002)

Authors
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne
Abstract
In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary state of logical theory and practice than does Carnap’s more moderate pluralism.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI jphil200299834
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Display Logic.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (4):375-417.
Negation in Relevant Logics (How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Routley Star).Greg Restall - 1999 - In Dov Gabbay & Heinrich Wansing (eds.), What is Negation? Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53-76.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be.Rosanna Keefe - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390.
Pluralism and Proofs.Greg Restall - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):279-291.

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