Erkenntnis 79 (S2):279-291 (2014)

Authors
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne
Abstract
Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism (2006) characterises pluralism about logical consequence in terms of the different ways cases can be selected in the analysis of logical consequence as preservation of truth over a class of cases. This is not the only way to understand or to motivate pluralism about logical consequence. Here, I will examine pluralism about logical consequence in terms of different standards of proof. We will focus on sequent derivations for classical logic, imposing two different restrictions on classical derivations to produce derivations for intuitionistic logic and for dual intuitionistic logic. The result is another way to understand the manner in which we can have different consequence relations in the same language. Furthermore, the proof-theoretic perspective gives us a different explanation of how the one concept of negation can have three different truth conditions, those in classical, intuitionistic and dual-intuitionistic models
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9477-9
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Foundations of Constructive Analysis.John Myhill - 1972 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (4):744-747.
Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Constructive Analysis.Errett Bishop & Douglas Bridges - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):1047-1048.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
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