Not a Hope in Hell
Beijing: Routledge (
forthcoming)
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Abstract
[The following is a draft abstract:]
This book aims to diagnose and tackle a problem concerning God's action. If God has good reasons for everything He does, then it does not seem as if God could do otherwise than He does. If God were to do otherwise than what He has good reason to do (we might think) God would act arbitrarily. While this general problem has been dealt with in various ways by philosophers, I propose that a specific version of that problem is serious and has not been adequately resolved. If sin is in no way good for anyone who commits it, or anything else, and God could have prevented each of our sins from occurring, then how could God allow each of our sins for good reasons? In particular, how could God allow each sin on account of the good of the person who commits the sin? The worst case of this problem concerns God's decisions to allow anyone to remain in a sinful state forever and end up in hell.
The book makes progress toward resolving this problem by working through a series of related proposals: that anyone being in hell is impossible; that God cannot prevent our sins or allows them for no reason at all or requires them to achieve His purposes; that God does not care about us all but only the elect. After rejecting these alternatives, I outline the way in which God merely foreknows our sins but does not require or necessitate or cause sin to occur. Then, I propose that God allows sin, and even damnation, on account of His love for us. There is nothing that can happen to us which would cause God to stop loving us; and there is always hope for us, even when things appear most hopeless.