Against postulating central systems in the mind

Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312 (1990)
This paper is concerned with a recent argument of Jerry Fodor's to the effect that the frame problem in artificial intelligence is in principle insoluble. Fodor's argument is based on his contention that the mind is divided between encapsulated modular systems for information processing and 'central systems' for non-demonstrative inference. I argue that positing central systems is methodologically unsound, and in fact involves a muddle that bears a strong family resemblance to the basic error in dualism. I therefore conclude that Fodor's position on the frame problem should be rejected
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Dualism  Mind  Science  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1086/289550
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