A farewell to functionalism

Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14 (1985)
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Abstract

dilemma, a dilemma concerning the individuation of psychological states that explain behavior. Beliefs are individuated by most functionahsts in terms of that 'that'-clauses; functional states are individuated 'narrowly' (i.e.

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10.1007/bf00372403

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Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Object-Dependent Thoughts.Steven E. 0Boër - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (1):51-85.
Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.
On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation.Stuart Silvers - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (March):49-73.
Saving psychological solipsism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.

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References found in this work

Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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