One kind of philosopher takes it as a working hypothesis that belief/desire psychology (or, anyhow, some variety of prepositional attitude psychology) is ...

Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature DAVID BULLER Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005 564 pages, ISBN: 0262025795 (hbk); $37.00.

The meta-scientific investigation of the various kinds of influence which determine both the establishment of the cultural institution of science and criteria governing its internal operations, including criteria of the concepts of cognition has been termed by Professor Jürgen Habermas as the critical theory of science. The five-fold thesis of his theory treats of what he considers to be the extrascientific interests which determine and accompany our traditional concepts of knowledge as characterized by science. The development of the theses is (...) preceded by his analysis of the faults of "positivist methodology" in which, he argues, distinctions such as that between facts and values are based upon fundamental confusions concerning inerradicable and pervasive practical concerns in terms of which the concepts of cognition are ultimately founded. He identifies the three all-embracing knowledge-guiding interests or concerns as the cognitive interest which determines logical and empirical categories, the practical interest which determines the character of human understanding within the cultural sciences, and the emancipatory interest which determines our concept for freedom and autonomy. The arguments for the critical theory are here analyzed and criticized in terms of their logical shortcomings, while the claims made in favor of the critical theory are found to be based upon inerradicable and pervaisive confusions concerning logical consistency in argumentation. The final section summarizes, moralizes, and speculates upon the criticalness of the critical theory. (shrink)

Agent causation presupposes that actions are behaviors under the causal control of the agent’s mental states, its beliefs and desires. Here the idea of conscious causation in causal explanations of actions is examined, specifically, actions said to be the result of conscious efforts. Causal–functionalist theories of consciousness purport to be naturalistic accounts of the causal efficacy of consciousness. Flanagan argues that his causal–functionalist theory of consciousness satisfies naturalistic constraints on causation and that his causal efficacy thesis is compatible with results (...) of Libet’s experiments on conscious causation. First, the notions of conscious effort and conscious causation are analyzed with respect to the project of naturalizing the mind, that is, the attempt to assimilate folk-psychological explanation to the causal model of explanation in the natural sciences. It is argued that a serious obstacle for any naturalist program is that mental states are individuated by their semantic content, not the mechanistic, physical properties of their neural state instantiations. In particular, it is argued that explanation by reference to mental state content yields not a causal but an interpretive or rationalizing account of action in which the question of causal efficacy is irrelevant. Then, Flanagan’s causal–functionalist theory of consciousness is critically assessed; specifically his interpretations of Libet’s negative experimental results on the causal efficacy of consciousness are diagnosed and disputed. It is contended that Flanagan misinterprets the results of Libet’s consciousness experiments and that his functionalist concept of consciousness fails to yield an adequate explanation of the alleged causal efficacy of consciousness. Finally, his thesis is countered with other experimental results that appear to favor an epiphenomenalist view over the causal efficacy account of consciousness. (shrink)

The work of cognitive psychologists, philosophical naturalists, post-modernists, and other such epistemic subversives conspires to endanger the well being of traditional analytic epistemology. Stephen Stich ( et tu Stich) has contributed his design for epistemology's coffin. I look hard at his proposed radical revision of epistemology. The ostensible target of Stich's analysis is the traditional enterprise of analytic epistemology. It is, however, the conceptual pillars that underpin both the traditional analytic and naturalist epistemologies that are the primary focus. It is (...) a conceptual domain neutral to the priorists and naturalists which Stich calls normative cognitive monism . Normative cognitive monism is the view that there is a unique system of cognitive processes that people should use. The point of Stich's analytical exercise is to disabuse us of the belief that there is such a unique and global set of standards by which cognitive performance is to be evaluated. He argues that all the evidence, both empirical and conceptual, leads away from this ultimately chauvinistic view and converges on normative cognitive pluralism which is the denial of monism. The same evidence that informs normative cognitive monism confirms normative cognitive pluralism. The empirical evidence is provided by the results of celebrated experiments on reasoning, or as Stich calls it, cognitive performance. The conceptual evidence derives from the failure of naturalistic accounts of intentional content. Stich's (1983) derisive view of theories of intentional content adumbrated in From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science is now the linchpin of his pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. (shrink)

A pesar de toda la plausibilidad del externalismo en relación al significado lingüístico, la cuestión crucial es la de cómo el externalismo se enfrenes a nuestras intuiciones cartesianas mas profundas sobre el contenido de la experiencia consciente. La tradición cartesiana respecto a la experiencia consciente parece invulnerable al análisis externalista porque las propiedades fenomenológicas de los estados conscientes sitúan el lugar de la experiencia enteramente dentro del sujeto de la misma, y la bacen exclusivamente dependiente de él. Un externalismo consecuente (...) y consistente acerca de la mente requiere un argumento sobre la experiencia consciente paralelo al desarrollado sobre el significado. En este trabajo, se examina críticamente un argumento elaborado por Martin Davies a favor de la compatibilidad del externalismo con la idea de la existencia de un contenido no-conceptual en la experiencia perceptiva consciente, el contenido perceptual de los estados mentales en cuanto son experimentados por criaturas conscientes. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology, the self-proclaimed scientific theory of human nature, owes much of its controversial notoriety to reports in public media. In part this is because of its bold claims that human psychological characteristics are adaptations to the Pleistocene environment in which they evolved and these inherited characteristics we exhibit now constitute our human nature. Proponents maintain that evolutionary psychology is a scientific account of human nature that explains what this much abused concept means. Critics counter that some evolutionary psychological hypotheses (...) threaten to undermine other intuitive concepts of human nature and well-being, specifically, by emphasizing purported scientific evidence of natural inequalities based on sex, gender, or race. They argue that this “gene machine” view entails consequences endorsing or at least seeming to give scientific aid and comfort to politically conservative, “right-wing” social agendas. Proponents deny that the theory has such unwelcome implications. Such objections, they reply, stem from “left-wing” egalitarian ideologies that presuppose the cogency of the disputed tabula rasa concept of mind intrinsic to the standard social science model of behavior explanations. Philip Kitcher’s initial scathing analysis of sociobiology, now called evolutionary psychology, as the science of human nature went basically unchallenged. Bioethicist Janet Radcliffe Richards has given a detailed critique of Kitcher’s arguments; she finds them to be “leftward-leaning,” and wanting. Here I examine her arguments and find them wanting though not “rightward-leaning.”. (shrink)

Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a (...) dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism. (shrink)

Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism.

A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding intentional (...) ascription from paper clips. Fodor (1986) has defended RTM against this slippery slope objection. He distinguishes between the kinds of creatures that exhibit selective responses to nomic properties of stimuli (for example, psychophysical properties) and the kinds of creatures that also respond selectively to nonnomic properties of stimuli (for example, being a crumpled shirt). The distinction marks the differences between two kinds of "primal scenes" in which lawful relations are said to hold between an organism's behavior, representational state, and stimulus property. The arguments for the distinction are provocative but counter-examples show them to be inconclusive. (shrink)

The distinction between mature and immature science is controversial. Laudan (1977) disavows the idea of immature science while Von Eckardt (1993) claims that cognitive science is just that (an immature science) and modifies Laudan's Research Tradition methodology to argue its rational pursuability . She uses the (Kuhnian) idea of a framework of shared characteristics (FSC) to identify the community of cognitive scientists. Diverse community assumptions pertaining specifically to human cognitive capacities (should) consolidate cognitive research efforts into a coherent and rationally (...) pursuable scientific endeavor. Von Eckardt maintains that the substantive assumptions about the computational and representational character of human cognitive capacities are central to the rational reconstruction of immature cognitive science in two ways. Descriptively, these assumptions are evident in the cognitive science community. Normatively, the assumptions satisfy justificatory conditions on the rational pursuit of this computational, cognitive science research tradition. Normativity is a problem for any naturalistic approach and thus for Von Eckardt's FSC. I critique the FSC strategy and present a modestly naturalistic alternative based on ideas of Goodman, Quine, and more recently, Philip Kitcher. I apply them to the “childhood afflictions” endemic to immaturity, scientific and otherwise. I test my critique of immature computational cognitive science by discussing two phenomena that, in my view, belong properly to any theory of human cognition but are noticeably absent from Von Eckardt's FSC reconstruction. I conclude that understanding the reasons why the FSC view fails can and should contribute to the development of a successful and complete theory of human cognition. (shrink)

The question is, How does the brain make its mind? In Cognition, computation and consciousness [Ito et al. (Eds) (1997) Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press], a variety of noted theoreticians from the fields of cognitive psychology, computer science, and philosophy postulate answer-blueprints rather than full-blown explanatory solutions to this most nettlesome question. Coming to the problem from quite different starting points and perspectives, they nevertheless succeed in reaching consensus on the idea that the contingencies of the brain's evolution (...) have resulted in an organ that generates its mind by a complex process of information exchange among its constituents. Put in the vernacular, the brain produces its mind by having its parts, especially those most recently evolved, talk to each other. In this essay I take a critical look at proposals of several celebrated (neuro)scientists and philosophers in their specific areas of expertise. The underlying theme of brain component communication suggests the image of conversations in the cortex. From such cortical conversations arise selves (the mind/brain's I) and their stories and projects. This in turn suggests the idea that the brain is a stage where a Pirandello-like play is continually rehearsed. (shrink)