Hypatia 19 (1):73-101 (2004)
: Some feminist epistemologists make the radical claim that there are varieties of epistemically valid warrant that agents access only through having lived particular types of contingent history, varieties of epistemic warrant to which, moreover, the confirmation-theoretic accounts of warrant favored by some traditional epistemologists are inapplicable. I offer Aristotelian virtue as a model for warrant of this sort, and use loosely Aristotelian vocabulary to express, and begin to evaluate, a range of feminist epistemological positions
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References found in this work BETA
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
[Book Review] the Science Question in Feminism. [REVIEW]Sandra G. Harding - 1988 - Feminist Studies 14 (1):561-574.
Citations of this work BETA
Feminist Epistemology at Hypatia's 25th Anniversary.Helen Longino - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (4):733-741.
Managing Salience: The Importance of Intellectual Virtue in Analyses of Biased Scientific Reasoning.Moira Howes - 2012 - Hypatia 27 (4):736-754.
Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge.Rebecca Kukla - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):80-95.
Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy.Amanda Roth - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (2):316 - 333.
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