Nancy Daukas [9]Nancy Veronica Daukas [1]
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Nancy V. Daukas
Guilford College
  1. Epistemic trust and social location.Nancy Daukas - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):109-124.
    Epistemic trustworthiness is defined as a complex character state that supervenes on a relation between first- and second-order beliefs, including beliefs about others as epistemic agents. In contexts shaped by unjust power relations, its second-order components create a mutually supporting link between a deficiency in epistemic character and unjust epistemic exclusion on the basis of group membership. In this way, a deficiency in the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness plays into social/epistemic interactions that perpetuate social injustice. Overcoming that deficiency and, along (...)
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    Epistemic Trust and Social Location.Nancy Daukas - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):109-124.
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    Epistemic Trust and Social Location.Nancy Daukas - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):109-124.
  4. Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology in.Nancy Daukas - 2011 - In Heidi Grasswick (ed.), Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge.
    In this paper I develop and support a feminist virtue epistemology and bring it into conversation with feminist contextual empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The virtue theory I develop is centered on the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness, which foregrounds the social/political character of knowledge practices and products, and the differences between epistemic agencies that perpetuate, on the one hand, and displace, on the other hand, normative patterns of unjust epistemic discrimination. I argue that my view answers important questions regarding epistemic (...)
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    Gender and Feminist Epistemology.Nancy Daukas - 2016 - In Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee & David Coady (eds.), A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 61–75.
    Much feminist epistemology has liberatory political objectives; therefore it is activist. Its non‐ideal theorizing reveals how social differences and power affect knowers, knowing, knowledge, and epistemological theorizing to sustain conditions of oppression, and articulates how norms and practices of knowing, in daily life and in the sciences, ought to change to enable social transformations. It articulates and promotes new, more inclusive, expansive, and nuanced epistemic norms and practices that produce knowledge and understanding needed to overcome structures of oppression and to (...)
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    Scepticism and the framework‐relativity of enquiry.Nancy Daukas - 1994 - Ratio 7 (2):95-110.
    Many argue that sceptical enquiry is incoherent insofar as it requires a detachment from and assessment of the framework judgements that constitute our practice of enquiry. This paper accepts that enquiry is relative to a framework, but argues that the Cartesian sceptical enquiry is consistent with that relativity. Part I presents Marie McGinn's Wittgen‐steinian anti‐sceptical argument, comparing its view of enquiry to Carnap's. Part II clarifies the sense in which Wittgenstein's ‘Moore‐type’ framework judgements could be unquestionable, and argues that McGinn's (...)
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  7. Classroom Relativism as Pedagogical Opportunity.Nancy Daukas - 2004 - American Philosophical Association Newsletter 3 (2):2-6.
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    Skepticism, contextualism, and the epistemic "ordinary".Nancy Daukas - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):63–79.
    This paper argues that epistemic contextualism misrepresents ordinary epistemic practices and fails to adequately respond to skepticism. It offers an alternative account of contextual variation in epistemic practices on which epistemic standards are stable, but met differently in different contexts. Contexts are determined by background presuppositions, which vary with types of inquiry. The presuppositions behind some inquiries imply that some standards of knowledge have 'already' been met. This view does not solve the skeptical problem, but aims to elucidate ordinary epistemic (...)
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    704 philosophical abstracts.Job van Eck & Nancy Daukas - 1995 - Phronesis 40 (1).