Philosophy of Science 66 (2):208-220 (1999)

Authors
Sahotra Sarkar
University of Texas at Austin
John Stachel
Boston University
Abstract
David Malament's (1977) well-known result, which is often taken to show the uniqueness of the Poincare-Einstein convention for defining simultaneity, involves an unwarranted physical assumption: that any simultaneity relation must remain invariant under temporal reflections. Once that assumption is removed, his other criteria for defining simultaneity are also satisfied by membership in the same backward (forward) null cone of the family of such cones with vertices on an inertial path. What is then unique about the Poincare-Einstein convention is that it is independent of the choice of inertial path in a given inertial frame, confirming a remark in Einstein 1905. Similarly, what is unique about the backward (forward) null cone definition is that it is independent of the state of motion of an observer at a point on the inertial path.
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DOI 10.1086/392684
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Presentism and Relativity. [REVIEW]Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):327-346.
How Relativity Contradicts Presentism.Simon Saunders - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:277-.
Conventionality of Simultaneity.Allen Janis - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Uniqueness of Simultaneity.Domenico Giulini - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):651-670.
Causality and Temporal Order in Special Relativity.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):459-479.

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