Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593 (2012)

Aaron Schiller
Santa Clara University
After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris? gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject
Keywords Perception  Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion  Enactive Account  Inattentional Blindness  J. L. Austin  Wittgenstein  Forms of Life  Gorilla Experiment  Heidegger  Alva Noë
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.622437
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,968
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perception of Features and Perception of Objects.Daniel Burnston & Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):283-314.
Levinas's Philosophy of Perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):383-414.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion.Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6.
The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion.Jonathan Cohen - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.
An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception.Shannon Vallor - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.
Merleau-Ponty and the Mystery of Perception.Taylor Carman - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):630-638.
On Perceptual Presence.Kristjan Laasik - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459.
The Agent in Magenta.Dave Ward - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1).
Review: Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Mohan Matthen - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1160-1166.
Self–Other Contingencies: Enacting Social Perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.


Added to PP index

Total views
73 ( #135,130 of 2,403,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #197,880 of 2,403,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes