The primacy of fact perception

Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593 (2012)
After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris? gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject
Keywords Perception  Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion  Enactive Account  Inattentional Blindness  J. L. Austin  Wittgenstein  Forms of Life  Gorilla Experiment  Heidegger  Alva Noë
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.622437
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Levinas's Philosophy of Perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):383-414.

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