Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593 (2012)
After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue that which facts are perceived is determined by contexts which are themselves determined by our interests. Here I appeal to Heidegger's views on everyday coping as a foundational form of intentional directedness. A discussion of Simons and Chabris? gorilla experiment provides contemporary empirical support of the Heideggerian analysis. Finally, I argue that there cannot be context-free perception on the enactive account inasmuch as perception, qua action, is always permeated with the interests of the subject
|Keywords||Perception Adelson's Checkershadow Illusion Enactive Account Inattentional Blindness J. L. Austin Wittgenstein Forms of Life Gorilla Experiment Heidegger Alva Noë|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Review of Alva Noë's Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Times Literary Supplement.
The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion.Jonathan Cohen - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.
Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of Supposedly Superfluous Representations.Jason Ford - 2009 - Cognitive Critique 1 (1):101-114.
An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception.Shannon Vallor - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.
Merleau-Ponty and the Mystery of Perception.Taylor Carman - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (4):630-638.
On Perceptual Presence.Kristjan Laasik - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459.
Self–Other Contingencies: Enacting Social Perception. [REVIEW]Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
Why Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted.Pierre Jacob - 2006 - Psyche 12 (1).
Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
Added to index2012-01-23
Total downloads50 ( #103,732 of 2,163,683 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,897 of 2,163,683 )
How can I increase my downloads?