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Summary

The objects of perception are what we are directly aware of when perceiving. Are these objects physical objects in our environment? Direct realists argue they are. A common challenge to direct realism draws on cases of hallucination: when I am hallucinating, I seem to be perceptually aware of something, yet there is no physical object present for me to be aware of. By contrast to direct realists, sense datum theorists maintain that sense data rather than physical objects in our environment are immediately present to the mind. Sense data are mind-dependent objects that actually have the properties (e.g., color and shape) that we may take external objects to possess in perception. There are two varieties of sense datum theory. On indirect realist views, sense data “stand in for” or represent physical objects. On idealist views, we are directly aware of sense data, yet there are no physical objects for which they stand in. A different type of position is developed by intentionalists, who distinguish the object of perception from its content. On this view, perceptual states are intentionally directed toward physical objects and their properties, yet physical objects can be misrepresented in perception because the content of a perceptual state may fail to match its object.

Key works Versions of direct realism have recently been defended by Brewer 2007, Campbell 2002, and Martin 2002. Versions of indirect realism have been defended by Broad 1925, Jackson 1978, Robinson 1994, and Russell 1912. Classic arguments for idealism appear in Berkeley 1988, and a recent defense can be found in Foster 2000. Intentionalist views have been developed by Anscombe 1965, Harman 1990, Crane 2001, and Byrne 2001.
Introductions Crane 2005, Huemer 2005, O'Brien 2003.
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  1. The Significance of the Many Property Problem.Tim Crane & Alex Grzankowski - manuscript
    One of the most influential traditional objections to Adverbialism about perceptual experience is that posed by Frank Jackson’s ‘many property problem’. Perhaps largely because of this objection, few philosophers now defend Adverbialism. We argue, however, that the essence of the many property problem arises for all of the leading metaphysical theories of experience: all leading theories must simply take for granted certain facts about experience, and no theory looks well positioned to explain the facts in a straightforward way. Because of (...)
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  2. Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  3. On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience.Tim Klaassen - manuscript
    I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.
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  4. The Subject-Dependency of Perceptual Objects.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Entities that are, in ordinary perceptual situations, veridically presented as objects can be called ‘perceptual objects’. In the philosophical literature, one can find various approaches to the crucial features that distinguish the class of perceptual objects. While these positions differ in many respects, they share an important general feature: they all characterize perceptual objects as largely subject-independent. More specifically, they do not attribute a significant constitutive role to the perceptual relation connecting a fragment of the environment with a perceiving subject. (...)
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  5. A Representationalist Reading of Kantian Intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.
    There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they (...)
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  6. Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
    When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading (...)
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  7. Austerity and Illusion.Craig French & Ian Phillips - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (15):1-19.
    Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically (...)
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  8. How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Gatzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.
    This chapter argues that olfactory experiences represent either everyday objects or ad hoc olfactory objects as having primitive olfactory properties, which happen to be uninstantiated. On this picture, olfactory experiences reliably misrepresent: they falsely represent everyday objects or ad hoc objects as having properties they do not have, and they misrepresent in the same way on multiple occasions. One might worry that this view is incompatible with the plausible claim that olfactory experiences at least sometimes justify true beliefs about the (...)
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  9. Recorded Sounds and Auditory Media.Vivian Mizrahi - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1551-1567.
    A widespread view among philosophers and scientists is that recorded sounds and assisted hearing differ fundamentally from natural sounds and direct hearing. It is commonly claimed, for example, that the sounds we hear over the phone are not sounds emitted by the voice of our interlocutor, but the sounds reproduced by the phone’s loudspeaker. According to this view, hearing distant sounds through communication and audio equipment is at best indirect and at worst illusory. In what follows, I shall reject these (...)
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  10. On Perceiving Continuity: The Role of Memory in the Perception of the Continuity of the Same Things.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1979-1995.
    Theories of philosophy of perception are too simplifying. Direct realism and representationalism, for example, are philosophical theories of perception about the nature of the perceived object and its location. It is common sense to say that we directly perceive, through our senses, physical objects together with their properties. However, if perceptual experience is representational, it only appears that we directly perceive the represented physical objects. Despite psychological studies concerning the role of memory in perception, what these two philosophical theories do (...)
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  11. Bertrand Russell on Logical Constructions: Matter as a Logical Construction From Sense-Data.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - AL-Mukhatabat 36:13-33.
    The notion of logical construction was used by Bertrand Russell in the early 20th century, which originally comes from A. N. Whitehead. Russell said that matter as a mind-independent thing can only be known by description. He also argued that matter is a logical construction of sense-data. However, this leads to an incoherent view of the direct or indirect connection between a mind and the external world. The problem examining is whether a collapsing house is a logical construction of the (...)
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  12. Naïve Realism: A Simple Approach.Justin Christy - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2167-2185.
    Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same object. This, (...)
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  13. How Naïve Realism Can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.
    Visual experiences seem to exhibit phenomenological particularity: when you look at some object, it – that particular object – looks some way to you. But experiences exhibit generality too: when you look at a distinct but qualitatively identical object, things seem the same to you as they did in seeing the first object. Naïve realist accounts of visual experience have often been thought to have a problem with each of these observations. It has been claimed that naïve realist views cannot (...)
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  14. Naive Realism and the Scientific Narration of Perception.Andrea Bucci - 2018 - Brainfactor:01-05.
    Naive realism is a widely debated topic in the philosophy of the mind. In this article I will review the theses of naive realism through the works of one of the most influential philosophers who supported and developed them, Michael Martin. Once the reasons why naive realism should be supported are discussed, I will propose an empirical argument to show that naive realism and the most basic scientific knowledge of perceptive processes are contradictory.
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  15. On Silhouettes, Surfaces and Sorensen.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - In Clare Mac Cumhaill & Thomas Crowther (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-218.
    In his book “Seeing Dark Things” (2008), Roy Sorensen provides many wonderfully ingenious arguments for many surprising, counter-intuitive claims. One such claim in particular is that when we a silhouetted object – i.e. an opaque object lit entirely from behind – we literally see its back-side – i.e. we see the full expanse of the surface facing away from us that is blocking the incoming light. Sorensen himself admits that this seems a tough pill to swallow, later characterising it as (...)
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  16. Perception Pragmatized: A Pragmatic Reconciliation of Representationalism and Relationalism.André Sant’Anna - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):411-432.
    This paper develops a theory of perception that reconciles representationalism and relationalism by relying on pragmatist ideas. I call it the pragmatic view of perception. I argue that fully reconciling representationalism and relationalism requires, first, providing a theory in which how we perceive the world involves representations; second, preserving the idea that perception is constitutively shaped by its objects; and third, offering a direct realist account of perception. This constitutes what I call the Hybrid Triad. I discuss how Charles Peirce’s (...)
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  17. Perception as Recognizing.Mika Suojanen - 2018 - In Hemmo Laiho & Miira Tuominen (eds.), Havainto : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen yhden sanan kollokvion esitelmiä. Turku: University of Turku. pp. 161-167.
    Things appear in perception. My article will ask whether we can recognize the perceived object, without having a concept of that object, or even a concept "object". For example, can I experience a specific shade of red, without having a concept of that specific shade? Some philosophers, like McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999), claim for the necessity of concepts for perception. Using simple examples the article will challenge the idea that recognizing the object is based on the use of concepts. (...)
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  18. The Philosophy-Ladenness of Perception: A Philosophical Analysis of Perception In Husserl and Sartre.Mika Suojanen - 2018 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17:110–129.
    The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the (...)
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  19. Alternatywizm, dysjunktywizm i pluralizm doświadczeniowy.Paweł J. Zięba - 2018 - Studia Humanistyczne AGH 17 (1):7-19.
    The claim currently known as “disjunctivism” is usually interpreted in terms of exclusive disjunction. However, it can be also explicated through the lens of alternative denial. The aim of this paper is to show that the latter interpretation is more accurate. Firstly, it reflects the core of disjunctivism more precisely. Secondly, it reduces metaphysical weight of the claim, thereby making it more plausible.
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  20. The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space.Paul Linton - 2017 - Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    I use the distinction between perception and cognition to advance a novel account of visual shape and visual scale. 1. INTRODUCTION (Preface & Chapter 1) - I outline the distinction between perception and cognition, and give an overview of how cognitive influences were rejected, and later reincorporated back into, 3D vision. 2. VISUAL SHAPE (Chapter 2 & Chapter 3) - Traditional theories argue that 3D vision integrates binocular disparity, perspective, and shading into a single coherent percept. I argue instead that (...)
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  21. The Immediate Object of Perception: A Sense-Datum.Mika Suojanen - 2017 - Turku: Reports from the Department of Philosophy.
    The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical (...)
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  22. The Immediate Object of Perception: A Sense-Datum.Mika Suojanen - 2017 - Turku: Reports from the Department of Philosophy.
    The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical (...)
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  23. Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  24. The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces.William E. S. Mcneill - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):411-431.
    It is often assumed that when we see common opaque objects in standard light this is in virtue of seeing their facing surfaces. Here I argue that we should reject that claim. Either we don't see objects' facing surfaces, or—if we hold on to the claim that we do see such things—it is at least not in virtue of seeing them that we see common opaque objects. I end by showing how this conclusion squares both with our intuitions and with (...)
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  25. Review of James Stazicker (Ed.) The Structure of Perceptual Experience. [REVIEW]Christopher Mole - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1.
    NDPR review of James Stazicker (ed.) The Structure of Perceptual Experience.
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  26. Objects for Multisensory Perception.Casey O’Callaghan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1269-1289.
    Object perception deploys a suite of perceptual capacities that constrains attention, guides reidentification, subserves recognition, and anchors demonstrative thought. Objects for perception—perceptual objects—are the targets of such capacities. Characterizing perceptual objects for multisensory perception faces two puzzles. First is the diversity of objects across sensory modalities. Second is the unity of multisensory perceptual objects. This paper resolves the puzzles. Objects for perception are structured mereologically complex individuals. Perceptual objects are items that bear perceptible features and have perceptible parts arranged to (...)
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  27. Contextualism About Object-Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2377-2396.
    When is seeing part of an object enough to qualify as seeing the object itself? For instance, is seeing a cat’s tail enough to qualify as seeing the cat itself? I argue that whether a subject qualifies as seeing a given object varies with the context of the ascriber. Having made an initial case for the context-sensitivity of object-seeing, I then address the contention that it is merely a feature of the ordinary notion. I argue that the notions of object-seeing (...)
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  28. Kantian Nonconceptualism.Dennis Schulting (ed.) - 2016 - Palgrave.
  29. Smelling Matter.Benjamin D. Young - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):1-18.
    While the objects of olfaction are intuitively individuated by reference to the ordinary objects from which they arise, this intuition does not accurately capture the complex nature of smells. Smells are neither ordinary three-dimensional objects, nor Platonic vapors, nor odors. Rather, smells are the molecular structures of chemical compounds within odor plumes. Molecular Structure Theory is offered as an account of smells, which can explain the nature of the external object of olfactory perception, what we experience as olfactory objects, and (...)
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  30. The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):231-237.
    Adverbialists propose to analyse sentences of the form ‘Jane has a blue afterimage’ as ‘Jane afterimages blue-ly’. One commonly raised objection to adverbialism is the many-property problem, the problem of accounting for sentences that seem to ascribe more than one property to an afterimage . Plausible responses to this objection may be on offer. In this note, however, I will argue that the many-property problem resurfaces at the level of relations and that, at this level, no solution for the problem (...)
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  31. Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight.Marina Folescu - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1):19-36.
    In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with (...)
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  32. The Representationalism Versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism About Perception.Bence Nanay - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):321-336.
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. Perceptual (...)
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  33. The Nature of Object of Perception and Its Role in the Knowledge Concerning the External World.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - Turku: University of Turku.
    Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, (...)
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  34. The Nature of Object of Perception and Its Role in the Knowledge Concerning the External World.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - Turku: University of Turku.
    Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, (...)
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  35. A Direct Object of Perception.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (1):28-36.
    I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I appear to directly perceive a mind-independent material object. The theses I will use are similar to the time-gap argument and the argument from the relativity of perception. The visual object of imagination and the object of experience are in the same place. They also share common qualities such as the content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both (...)
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  36. What We Hear.Jason Leddington - 2014 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    A longstanding philosophical tradition holds that the primary objects of hearing are sounds rather than sound sources. In this case, we hear sound sources by—or in virtue of—hearing their sounds. This paper argues that, on the contrary, we have good reason to believe that the primary objects of hearing are sound sources, and that the relationship between a sound and its source is much like the relationship between a color and its bearer. Just as we see objects in seeing their (...)
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  37. The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
    Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. -/- Here I (...)
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  38. Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism.Bence Nanay - 2014 - In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this paper is to raise some serious worries about anti-representationalism: the recently popular view according to which there are no perceptual representations. Although anti-representationalism is more and more popular, I will argue that we have strong empirical reasons for mistrusting it. More specifically, I will argue that it is inconsistent with some important empirical findings about dorsal perception and about the multimodality of perception.
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  39. Auditory Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2009.
  40. The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.
    This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for the (...)
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  41. Bill Brewer, Perception and Its Objects. [REVIEW]Kenneth Hobson - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (6):437-439.
    In this focused and carefully argued book, Bill Brewer develops and defends the Object View (OV), a version of direct realism. Brewer appropriates for his foundational concept what he considers to be a key insight of the early modern tradition: perceptual experience is an irreducibly relational act of direct acquaintance, the direct object of which constitutes the fundamental nature of experience. While many of the early moderns held—partly as a consequence of the arguments from hallucination and illusion—that the direct objects (...)
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  42. The Objects of Bodily Awareness.John Schwenkler - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
    Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of his or her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than (...)
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  43. Perception of Features and Perception of Objects.Daniel Burnston & Jonathan Cohen - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):283-314.
    There is a long and distinguished tradition in philosophy and psychology according to which the mind’s fundamental, foundational connection to the world is made by connecting perceptually to features of objects. On this picture, which we’ll call feature prioritarianism, minds like ours first make contact with the colors, shapes, and sizes of distal items, and then, only on the basis of the representations so obtained, build up representations of the objects that bear these features. The feature priority view maintains, then, (...)
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  44. Locke and the Visual Array.Michael Jacovides - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):69-91.
    A.D. Smith opens his excellent paper, “Space and Sight,” by remarking, One of the most notable features of both philosophy and psychology throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the almost universal denial that we are immediately aware through sight of objects arrayed in three-dimensional space. This was not merely a denial of Direct Realism, but a denial that truly visual objects are even phenomenally presented in depth (481). Times have changed. As Smith writes, “It is hard to think of (...)
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  45. Look-Blindness.Jason Leddington - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):244-251.
    In Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts 2009, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael Tye claims that seeing can occur independently of seeing-that. Call this The Independence Claim (TIC). Tye supports this ‘general point’ by appeal to cases of ‘ubiquitous error’ (2009: 95). In this article, I show that this strategy fails: it is guilty of a certain blindness to how things look.
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  46. Sounds and Images.M. G. F. Martin - 2012 - British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4):331-351.
  47. Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
    The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features (...)
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  48. Perceiving Tropes.Bence Nanay - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to (...)
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  49. The Primacy of Fact Perception.Aaron Allen Schiller - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.
    After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue (...)
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  50. The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.
    Of all the problems attending the sense-datum theory, arguably the deepest is that it draws a veil of appearances over the external world. Today, the sense-datum theory is widely regarded as an overreaction to the problem of hallucination. Instead of accounting for hallucination in terms of intentional relations to sense data, it is often thought that we should account for it in terms of intentional relations to properties. In this paper, however, I argue that in the versions that might address (...)
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